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theory,	 liberal	 multiculturalism,	 cultural	 cosmopolitanism,	 and	 universal	 human	
rights	—	examine	culture	through	the	lens	of	culturally	embedded	individuals	or	texts,	







the	 terms	 of	 the	 other	 are	 rendered	 intelligible	 by	 translating	 them	 into	 familiar	
v	ocabulary.	Here,	“meaning”	points	to	“the	ways	in	which	people	attempt	to	make	

























that	 the	 radical	 reformer	Tan	Sitong	 formulated	around	1895,	 in	 support	of	 “total	
Westernization”	(quanpan Xihua).	Following	but	ultimately	contesting	the	dominant	












important	contributions	 to	 thinking	about	cross-cultural	borrowing.	First,	he	 looks	
















Western Learning: Moving Meaning across Space?
Western	Learning	was	not	a	coherent	movement	so	much	as	a	diffuse	and	contested	



























fen	 (1809–1874),	 began	 to	 point	 out	 that	 simple	 know-how	 was	 not	 sufficient	 to	






























































Tan Sitong’s Argument for Western Learning and “Total Westernization”
As	one	of	 the	most	 dynamic	 and	passionate	 thinkers	 of	China’s	 late-Qing	 reform	
generation,	Tan	Sitong	makes	for	a	difficult	case	study.	Beginning	as	a	staunch	de-
fender	of	Chinese	ethnocentrism,	Tan	eventually	became	one	of	 the	more	 radical	














qi	or	“vessel.”	Citing	Wang	Fuzhi’s	Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes,	Tan	









































social	 practices,	 from	 education	 to	 marriage	 arrangements,	 female	 l	iberation	 and	
















ety	 to	 flourish	 again	 (Quanji,	 p.	 227)	—	but	 given	 the	 protean	 working	 of	 qi,	 it	 is	
u	nclear	on	what	grounds	such	re-establishment	would	proceed.	In	a	bold	reversal	of	
anxieties	held	by	earlier	conservatives	such	as	Woren	(1804–1871),	who	condemned	
Western	Learning	 in	 the	belief	 that	Western	 ideas	and	objects	 could	contaminate	
Chinese	 values,	Tan	 complains	 in	 his	 treatise	 “Mathematics”	 that	 “we	 stagnantly	
adopt	only	the	branches	of	the	Westerners,”	that	is,	their	guns	and	ships,	but	“leave	
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behind	 their	 greatest	 essence”	 (Quanji,	p.	161).	The	problem	 for	Tan	 is	not	being	
contaminated	enough,	not	radically	 transforming	to	 the	degree	necessary	to	make	
Western	qi	(and	dao)	work.







































affairs”	will	enable	one	to	“complete	 the	qi”	appropriate	 to	Western	dao	 (Quanji,	
p.	171	n.	16).
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this	 relationship	between	what	we	can	perhaps	better	 translate	as	appearance	 (qi)	







tice	 that	 enable	 qi	 to	 exist	 at	 particular	 times	 and	 places,	 but	 without	 implying	
beforehand	what	“Western”	dao(s)	will	look	like;	it	allows	for	learning	and	develop-
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Tan’s	 work	 suggests	 a	 more	 complex	 application	 of	 the	 ti/yong	 and	 dao/qi	
d	ichotomies,	 but	 he	 shares	much	 in	 common	with	his	 earlier	 progenitors.	 Zhang	














If	Chinese	substance	can	stand	 in	place	of	Western	substance	 to	 support	Western	
utility,	as	Zhang	believes,	then	the	analytic	(not	to	mention	logistic)	obstacles	to	this	
form	of	cross-cultural	borrowing	are	drastically	abated.	If	this	is	not	possible,	as	Tan	





























domination.33	To	 avoid	 the	 imposition	 of	 essentialism,	 and	 to	 capture	 the	 hybrid	
character	of	much	contemporary	cultural	identity,	many	theorists	in	political	theory	










































ment	 by	 the	 larger	 culture	 in	 which	 they	 are	 territorially	 embedded.41	 By	 seeing	
cultural	life	as	so	deeply	embedded	in	a	collective	lifestyle	that	its	community	must	
















tions	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	 meaningfully	 borrowed,	 on	 the	 other.	 Where	 Waldron	
r	ejects	or	fails	to	consider	a	definition	of	culture	as	institutionally	reliant,	and	com-
parative	political	theorists	read	culture	as	accessible	only	partially	through	dialogic	







two.	 Rather,	 the	 very	 replicability	 of	 qi	 enables	 the	 portability	 of	 culture	—	not	 in	
Waldron’s	cosmopolitan	sense,	which	“ignores	the	dependence	of	these	practices	on	





the	problem	of	 incommensurability	 involves	 familiarizing	erstwhile	outsiders	with	
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the	canonical	languages	of	particular	traditions,43	Tan	broaches	the	need	for	institu-



















and	 other	 reformers	 wanted	 China	 to	 adopt	 institutions,	 such	 as	 parliamentary	
g	overnment,	 that	 were	 not	 creative	 interpretations	 of	 those	 institutions	 but	 were	
themselves	those	institutions	—	that	is,	they	had	to	mean	to	Chinese	what	they	meant	
















preted	 experience	 toward	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 communities	 of	 individuals	 govern,	
produce,	and	contest	meaning.
Authenticity	becomes	such	a	 recurring	element	of	Tan’s	analysis	precisely	be-
cause	he	and	his	 reformist	colleagues	believe	 that	 “learning	 from	 the	West”	must	
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Consider	 these	 definitions	 of	 “genuine”	 from	 the	 Oxford English Dictionary	
(which	explicitly	identify	the	word	with	“authenticity”):
3.	Really	proceeding	from	its	reputed	source	or	author;	not	spurious;	=	AUTHENTIC.49
4.	a.	Having	 the	character	or	origin	 represented;	 real,	 true,	not	counterfeit,	unfeigned,	
unadulterated.	(the) genuine article.50
By	 these	definitions,	 it	 is	only	 through	 faithful	 reproduction	and	 transmission	 that	
something	 can	 come	 to	 be	 called	 authentic.	 Firsthand	 creation	 or	 individualized	
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flourishes	would	 imply	heterodoxy,	a	bastard	 lineage	—	in	other	words,	 something	
spurious	 and	 profoundly	 inauthentic.	 Charles	Taylor	 indicates	 some	 of	 this	 sense	
when	he	points	out	that	“authentic”	commitments	need	not,	and	in	fact	cannot,	be	
rooted	only	in	subjective,	personal	value;	rather,	their	significance	must	be	indepen-




of	 Confucianism	 unclouded	 by	 generations	 of	 (particular)	 textual	 mediation,	 they	
mimicked	 the	 very	 people	 whose	 influence	 they	 sought	 to	 eradicate:	 the	 daoxue	
Neo-Confucianists,	 who	 believed	 that	 internal	 self-ordering	 and	 reflection	 rather	
than	excessive	reliance	on	texts	would	reveal	the	true	principle	(li)	obscured	beneath	
layers	of	material	existence	(qi2).	Both	were	rejecting	(different)	forms	of	textual	con-
vention	 to	 reveal	a	more	authentic	Confucian	 learning,	 in	which	authenticity	was	
constituted	not	by	an	act	of	spontaneous	and	original	creativity	but	by	the	faithful	
replication	of	what	the	ancients	really	meant.	For	the	scholars	of	Han	Learning,	this	




















standards,	 rather	 than	 the	 inscrutable	 interpretations	 of	 individuals,	 that	 sustain	





































bility	 and	 its	 goal	 or	 resolution	 is	 mutual	 understanding,	 often	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	
h	ermeneutical	 intervention	 from	 a	 self-conscious	 vantage	 point.55	 Individuals	 are	
primary	targets	and	participants	in	this	form	of	interaction:	it	 is	through	individual	
acts	of	comprehension,	psychological	adjustment,	commitment,	and	expression	that	
mutual	 intelligibility	 is	made	possible.	The	possibility	of	 grounding	analysis	 in	an	
alternative	 set	 of	 theoretically	 self-sufficient	 categories,	which	potentially	 offer	 an	




much	 each	 individual	 may	 share	 his	 knowledge	 with	 others,	 the	 performance	 of	










ing	 to	 cross-cultural	 borrowing,	 as	Tan	 does,	 dynamizes	 across	 space	 rather	 than	
simply	across	time	an	anthropological	or	social-science	view	of	cultural	practices.	
Borrowing	a	“culture”	or	one	of	 its	 forms,	 then,	must	somehow	preserve	this	play	
between	shared	symbols,	on	the	one	hand,	and	creative	deployment	of	or	critical	
resistance	to	them,	on	the	other.






















































ences	 that	 may	 or	 may	 not	 have	 direct	 relationships	 to	 the	 intellectual	 concerns	



























Heaven	 Ever	 Say?’	A	 Methods-Centered	Approach	 to	 Cross-Cultural	 Engage-
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Mencius	 were	 preserved	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Wang	 Fuzhi	 and	 fellow	 Hunanese	
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ancestor	Wang	by	emphasizing	practical	learning	that	“served	real	conditions”	
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